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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury convicted Billy Lee Joslin, Jr., of attempting to strangle and then raping his exgirlfriend, Ms. Darby, after the district court allowed his ex-wife, Ms. Joslin, to testify that
Mr. Joslin had strangled and raped her ten years prior. The district court purported to admit
Ms. Joslin’s testimony under the “common scheme or plan” exception to Idaho Criminal Rule
404(b), after finding that “[t]he circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct are so similar that
they objectively tend to demonstrate that the same person committed both acts.” (R., p.210
(emphasis added).) But everyone agreed Mr. Joslin’s identity was not at issue, and no one
suggested that the alleged crimes against Ms. Joslin were planned as part of a course of conduct
leading up to the alleged crimes against Ms. Darby. Because there is no “similar crimes”
exception to Rule 404(b), and Ms. Joslin’s testimony was relevant only to the impermissible
inference that “if he did it once, he probably did it again,” her testimony was pure propensity
evidence. Further, her testimony was unfathomably prejudicial, confusing, and misleading. The
district court thus erred and abused its discretion by admitting it. Because Ms. Joslin’s testimony
surely contributed to the verdicts in this case, the State will be unable to meet its burden of
proving otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court should vacate Mr. Joslin’s judgment
of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Joslin with the attempted strangulation and rape of his exgirlfriend, Ms. Darby, and also alleged he was a persistent violator. (R.,1 pp.292–95, 288–90.)
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Citations to the record refer to the numbers printed at the bottom middle of each page of the
record.
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Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine giving notice of its intent to introduce the
testimony of Mr. Joslin’s ex-wife regarding Mr. Joslin’s alleged attempted strangulation and rape
of her in 2006. (R., pp.249–70; 3/30/17 Tr., p.5, L.15–p.10, L.14, p.15, L.17–p.17, L.19.) The
State claimed that the 2006 incident was so similar to the alleged crime in this case that it was
relevant to show a common scheme or plan, or to rebut any claim of consent. (R., pp.249–70;
3/30/17 Tr., p.7, L.13–p.9, L.21.) The prosecutor framed the two allegations as follows:
[As alleged in this case,] Mr. Joslin obtained entry into his ex-girlfriend’s
home, strangled her until she was unconscious and then raped her. His method of
strangulation was peculiar in that he would alternate between using his hands to
choke her as well as use his hands to cover her mouth. He had duct tape with
him. After the rape he drove her vehicle to her place of employment and then left
in her vehicle.
....
In the July 30, 2006 rape and attempted strangulation, Mr. Joslin entered
into his estranged wife’s home early in the morning. She awoke to Mr. Joslin
placing a piece of duct tape over her mouth.
He strangled her into
unconsciousness and, after she regained consciousness, raped her. His method of
strangulation was peculiar: “They struggled all around the room, and at some
point, he took his hands off her neck and put his hand over his mouth [sic] over
her mouth. [Ms. Joslin] reported that the suspect then went back to choking her
. . .”
(R., pp.253–54 (citations omitted).)
To attempt to show a common scheme or plan, the State explained:
[I]n both cases Mr. Joslin has targeted a woman with whom he has had a
past sexual relationship. In both events the place of attack is the Victim’s home.
His method of subduing the women is strangulation and that method is unique in
that he chokes the women as well as cover their mouths. He strangled both
women until they were unconscious and then followed it up with rape. He also
has [sic] duct tape with him during both attacks. These factual scenarios are
obviously intensely similar and clearly indicative of a common plan, method or
scheme of sexually assaulting women. As such, evidence of the July 30, 2006
attempted strangulation and rape should be admissible at trial of this matter.
(R., p.254.)
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As for its claim that Ms. Joslin’s testimony went to disprove consent, the State relied on
State v. Williams, 156 Wash. App. 482, 488 (2010), in which the district court allowed evidence
that Williams strangled and raped a woman in 1995 to disprove consent in the two strangulation
and rape charges at issue in that case, which took place days apart in 2007. (R., p.255.) The
State did not attempt to explain how Ms. Joslin’s testimony would disprove that Ms. Darby
consented, but simply said: “At trial, it is expected that the defense will be that the victim
consented to the rape. Much like the situation in Williams, evidence of the 2006 incident is also
relevant to disproving consent and proving the forcible nature of the rape in the case at bar.”
(R., p.255.)
Mr. Joslin objected to that testimony on various grounds, including that it was not
particularly similar, was not relevant to anything other than propensity, was unduly prejudicial,
and would confuse the issues and the jury. (R., pp.217–24; 3/30/17 Tr., p.10, L.17–p.15, L.14.)
Specifically, Mr. Joslin asserted that the State failed “to show the existence of a common plan or
scheme relating Mr. Joslin’s prior conduct to this case,” Ms. Joslin’s testimony was “not relevant
to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity,” and that the
passage of ten years between the uncharged and charged conduct weighed against finding a
common scheme or plan. (R., pp.221–22.)
The court granted the State’s motion. (R., pp.199–214.) In doing so, it described the two
alleged incidents as follows:
The State seeks to introduce evidence from uncharged conduct occurring
in 2006 that includes:
•
•
•
•
•

Defendant was previously in a romantic relationship with A.J.,
A.J. ended the relationship,
Defendant was no longer living with A.J.,
Defendant sought reconciliation with A.J.,
A.J. rebuffed Defendant’s reconciliation efforts,
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Defendant surprised A.J. by forcing his way into A.J.’s bedroom,
Defendant placed his hands around A.J.’s neck and squeezed,
Defendant alternated between squeezing A.J.’s throat with his hands
and restricting A.J.’s breathing by covering her mouth with his hand,
At the point A.J. lost consciousness Defendant would remove his hand
from her mouth and allow her to breathe and regain consciousness,
Defendant had duct tape with him and put a piece over the A.J.’s
mouth,
Defendant raped A.J. by using force to penetrate A.J.’s vagina with his
penis.

In the present case the State alleges the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Defendant was previously in a romantic relationship with C.D.,
C.D. ended the relationship,
Defendant was no longer staying with C.D.,
Defendant sought reconciliation with C.D.,
C.D. rebuffed Defendant’s reconciliation efforts,
Defendant surprised C.D. by lying in wait for her at her apartment,
Defendant entered the residence uninvited when C.D. returned from
work,
Defendant placed his hands around C.D.’s neck and squeezed,
Defendant alternated between squeezing C.D.’s throat with his hands
and restricting C.D.’s breathing by covering her mouth with his hand,
Defendant had duct tape with him,
At the point C.D. lost consciousness Defendant would remove his
hand from her mouth and allow her to breathe and regain
consciousness,
Defendant raped C.D. by using force to penetrate C.D.’s vagina with
his penis.

(R., pp.202–03.)
It went on to find that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Joslin had
attempted to strangle and then raped Ms. Joslin, the evidence was relevant to common scheme or
plan, and the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudice to Mr. Joslin.
(R., pp.199–214.) The court’s relevance determination turned on what it considered to be “very
specific,” “stark,” and “remarkable” similarities between the two allegations. (R., pp.208–09.) It
explained:

4

Both the allegations stemming from the 2006 incident and those stemming from
the current case demonstrate that remarkably similar planning and preparation
was involved and that it is likely the same person committed both alleged
offenses.
While it is clear that the conduct alleged occurred over a signiﬁcant period
of time, and at different locales, the alleged similarities demonstrate a common
scheme or plan analogous to that found in Schwartzmiller. This Court ﬁnds the
substantial evidence in the record supports a ﬁnding that the uncharged conduct in
2006 is remarkably similar to what has been alleged in 2016. It is distinguishable
from the situation found in Johnson where the Court determined that the
molestation of the juveniles was “sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a
common scheme or plan.” The allegations here are more than the “bare fact that
sexual misconduct has occurred” in the past and more than general similarities.
The circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct are so similar that they
objectively tend to demonstrate that the same person committed both acts.
Therefore, this Court determines as a matter of law that the evidence to be
introduced at trial is relevant for a permissible purpose, speciﬁcally, to show a
common scheme or plan.
(R., pp.209–10 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).)
As for prejudice, the court explained:
The State intends to offer a single witness to testify about a single prior
incident. The Court ﬁnds that the amount of evidence the State seeks to introduce
weighs against a ﬁnding of unfair prejudice to Defendant. Further, given the
temporal remoteness of the two alleged incidents, this Court recognizes that an
increased level of similarity is required. The Court ﬁnds that substantial
similarity is present in this matter and the probative value of the evidence sought
to be admitted is greater than any prejudice to Defendant resulting from its
admission. Therefore, this Court ﬁnds the admission of the prior bad act does not
unfairly prejudice Defendant.
(R., p.212.)
The court later denied Mr. Joslin’s repeated attempts to ask the court reconsider that
decision. (R., pp.164–68 (Mr. Joslin’s motion to reconsider, arguing that “[t]he State’s
allegations offer no reason to believe that Mr. Joslin consciously planned his conduct, or that
sexual misconduct with one alleged victim was part of a criminal design to abuse the other.”),
157; Tr. Vol. III, p.513, Ls.12–25, p.522, L.13–p.530, L.12.) When doing so after Ms. Joslin’s
offer of proof at trial, the court found that the testimony goes to every exception under Rule
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404(b), except identity: “Motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, certainly absence of
mistake or accident.”

(Tr. Vol. III, p.529, Ls.9–16.)

It then explained that the evidence

“certainly is prejudicial,” but also found it to be “extremely probative,” and thus admissible.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.529, L.17–p.530, L.4.)
The State called a total of eighteen witnesses, including Ms. Darby; Ms. Darby’s Aunt,
daughter, and coworkers; the medical professionals who treated Ms. Darby; the police officers
and forensic scientists involved in the investigation; and Ms. Joslin.

According to that

testimony, Mr. Joslin and Ms. Darby starting dating in June 2016 and broke up in the middle of
August 2016. (Tr. Vol. III, p.410, L.23–p.411, L.17.) Mr. Joslin wanted to rekindle their
relationship, and so he would send Ms. Darby text messages and go by her apartment and the
Laundramutt, where she worked as a dog groomer. (Tr. Vol. II, p.259, L.1–p.62, L.25, p.270,
L.8–p.273, L.12; Tr. Vol. III, p.415, L.4–p.418, L.1.) Ms. Darby said that she rebuffed his
efforts to get back together with her. (Tr. Vol. III, p.415, L.4–p.418, L.1.)
On August 25, 2016, Ms. Darby had an unexpected cancellation at Laundramutt around
lunchtime, so she decided to make a quick trip back to her apartment. (Tr. Vol. III, p.419, L.2–
p.420, L.17.) After she unlocked her front door, Mr. Joslin rushed up behind her and said he
needed to use her phone. (Tr. Vol. III, p.420, L.18–p.421, L.17.) Ms. Darby testified that
Mr. Joslin grabbed her by her neck, took her to her couch, and choked her until she passed out.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.421, L.18–p.422, L.11.) She said that she lost consciousness multiple times—
Mr. Joslin would cover her mouth but let her breathe through her nose between chokings so that
she could come to, and then would choke her again until she passed out. (Tr. Vol. III, p.423,
L.1–p.424, L.18.) Ms. Darby testified that eventually Mr. Joslin told her to relax and take her
clothes off, and then he raped her. (Tr. Vol. III, p.424, Ls.16–24.) She said that she did not try
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to physically stop Mr. Joslin from raping her because she couldn’t or because “[h]e probably
would have killed [her].” (Tr. Vol. III, p.425, L.13–p.427, L.1.) Ms. Darby also testified that at
some point she decided to go along with whatever Mr. Joslin wanted because she realized he
didn’t want to kill her but just wanted her back. (Tr. Vol. III, p.427, Ls.2–25.) She said that
after he raped her, she caressed him and asked what she could do to fix things. (Tr. Vol. III,
p.427, Ls.21–23.)
Ms. Darby said that around 1:30 pm she got a text message from someone at work
because she was late for one of her appointments at Laundramutt. (Tr. Vol. III, p.430, Ls.12–
18.) She told Mr. Joslin that she needed to get back or they would get suspicious, and Mr. Joslin
drove her back to Laundramutt in her car with the plan that he’d pick her up at the end of the
day. (Tr. Vol. III, p.431, L.19–p.432, L.23, p.434, L.14–p.436, L.16, p.441, Ls.11–22.)
After Mr. Joslin dropped Ms. Darby off, she went inside and told her coworkers some
version of what had allegedly happened. (Tr. Vol. III, p.441, Ls.24–25 (Ms. Darby testifying
that “I pulled off my glasses and told them to call the cops, that he just tried to kill me,”);
Tr. Vol. II, p.253, Ls.10–14 (Ms. McKenna testifying that, “[s]he said he came up behind her
while she was getting in the house and grabbed her by the throat and put her up against the wall
and made her go in the house, and that he kept choking her, he let her come to, and then he kept
choking her.”), p.277, Ls.10–14 (Ms. Scardina testifying that, “[w]hen she approached her front
door, Billy was there, grabbed her, threw her in the house, locked the door, threw her down on
the couch, proceeded to start choking her until she would pass out, and then he would release
her, and that during this time, he raped her.”), p.278, Ls.17–21 (Ms. Scardina acknowledging that
her statement to the police did not mention that Ms. Darby had said she was raped), p.366, Ls.2–
4 (Mr. Miller testifying that, “[s]he said that he had beaten her, those exact words, and that she

7

had been choked, and at that point, I ran back and I yelled for my mom to come out . . .”).) One
of the coworkers called 911, and a friend took Ms. Darby to the hospital. (Tr. Vol. II, p.275,
Ls.10–16, p.281, Ls.12–13, p.342, Ls.5–18.)
Once at the hospital, Dr. Fooe examined and treated Ms. Darby.

He testified that

Ms. Darby said she had been raped and choked, that he saw abrasions around her neck and
bleeding over the whites of both eyes, and that he believed she had been sexually assaulted and
choked. (Tr. Vol. II, p.157, L.11–p.161, L.24.) When asked if the amount of pressure needed to
cause hemorrhaging in her eyes could be consistent with autoerotic asphyxiation, Dr. Fooe
testified “I suppose that you could have that. I am not sure how much pressure is involved in
that.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.166, Ls.18–22.) A nurse then performed a sexual assault examination and
collected biological evidence for a sexual assault kit. (Tr. Vol. II, p.308, L.22–p.311, L.13.)
That nurse said she did not believe, in her “own opinion” that Ms. Darby’s condition was
consistent with autoerotic asphyxiation. (Tr. Vol. II, p.319, Ls.9–12, p.320, Ls.3–10.)
After officers arrested Mr. Joslin, they took him to Kootenai Medical Center to draw his
blood and collect biological evidence for a sexual assault kit. (Tr. Vol. II, p.184, Ls.2–13, p.234,
L.22–p.236, L.16.)

According to Ms. Guess of the Idaho State Police Forensic Services

Laboratory, the rape kits showed that Ms. Darby’s vaginal swabs contained Mr. Joslin’s DNA.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.510, L.15–p.511, L.17.)
The State’s last witness was Ms. Joslin. She told the jury that she was married to
Mr. Joslin on July 30, 2016, but that they were separated and living apart. (Tr. Vol. III, p.541,
Ls.15–25.) She said she went to sleep that night in her bedroom, with the doors and windows
locked. (Tr. Vol. III, p.542, Ls.1–22.) At some point she woke up:
Q: What woke you up?
A: Billy’s hands were wrapped around my throat.
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Q: And when you woke up with his hands around your throat, could you breathe?
A: No.
Q: At some point did you go unconscious?
A: Yes.
Q: Was he squeezing your neck?
A: Yes.
....
Q: At some point did Mr. Joslin remove his hands from your neck?
A: Yes.
Q: Did he put his hands on any other part of your face?
A: My mouth.
Q: When he had his hand over your mouth, could you scream or make any noise?
A: Yes.
Q: What type of noise?
A: A muffled noise.
Q: Were you able to breathe through your nose?
A: Barely.
Q: Approximately how many times did he put his hand over your mouth and
allow you to breathe through your nose?
A: Countless times.
Q: More than five times?
A: More than five times.
Q: After he strangled you, did anything sexual happen?
A: Yes.
Q: What sexual thing happened?
A: He raped me.
Q: By “rape,” do you mean that he inserted his penis into your vagina against
your will?
A: Yes.
Q: And did this rape occur shortly after he strangled you?
A: Yes.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.542, L.25–p.544, L.22.) The court did not give any sort of limiting instruction at
that time. (Tr. Vol. III, p.548, L.14–p.549, L.12.)
Mr. Joslin did not call any witnesses in his defense. After both parties rested, the court
gave the jury its closing instructions, which included the following:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the
defendant committed crimes other than that for which the defendant is on trial.
Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to prove the
defendant’s character or that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes.
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Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of
proving the defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
or absence of mistake of accident.
(R., p.97; Tr. Vol. III, p.539, L.16–p.555, L.3.).
The jury found Mr. Joslin guilty of both counts (R., p.73), and the court sentenced him to
concurrent fixed life terms (R., pp.62–64). He timely appealed. (R., pp.53–57.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err and abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce irrelevant and
highly prejudicial testimony that Mr. Joslin strangled and raped his ex-wife ten years before
committing the alleged strangulation and rape in this case, and did that error surely contribute to
the verdicts?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Both Erred And Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Introduce
Irrelevant And Highly Prejudicial Testimony That Mr. Joslin Strangled And Raped His Ex-Wife
Ten Years Before Committing The Alleged Strangulation And Rape In This Case, And That
Error Surely Contributed To The Verdicts
Only relevant evidence, or evidence tending to make a fact of consequence to the action
more or less likely, is admissible. I.R.E. 401, 402. Similarly, evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to show a defendant’s criminal propensity. I.R.E. 404(b)(1). “It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”

State v.

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010); I.R.E. 404(b)(2). Even if evidence is relevant, the court
may exclude it “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” I.R.E. 403.
This Court reviews whether evidence is relevant de novo, while it reviews whether the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.
Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667. To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, the
Court asks if it (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards; and (3) reached
its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a
violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving, “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
221 (2008) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
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The district court erred and abused its discretion by allowing Ms. Joslin to testify because
her testimony was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. 2 First, the court erred by concluding
that Ms. Joslin’s testimony was relevant to common scheme or plan, motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, and absence of mistake or accident. (See Tr. Vol. III, p.529, Ls.9–16.) The court
essentially held that, because the two incidents were so similar, the former must be relevant to
proving the latter. (R., pp.208–09; Tr. Vol. III, p.529, Ls.9–16.) But there is no “similar crimes”
exception to Rule 404(b), and the relevance of Ms. Joslin’s testimony depended entirely on the
very inference that Rule 404 intends to guard against:

“[I]f he did it once, he probably did it

again.” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013). Thus, Ms. Joslin’s testimony was purely
propensity evidence which did not tend to make any fact of consequence more or less likely.
Second, the court abused its discretion by concluding that the probative value of
Ms. Joslin’s testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. Even if Ms. Joslin’s testimony were
relevant, it was so damning that the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and
misleading the jury heavily outweighed whatever slight probative value it could have had.
Because the district court erred and abused its discretion by admitting Ms. Joslin’s testimony,
and that error surely contributed to the verdicts, this Court should vacate Mr. Joslin’s judgment
of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.

2

Because Mr. Joslin believes that the analysis of the relevance and prejudice of Ms. Joslin’s
testimony is the same with respect to the two charges in this case, he addresses them together.
13

A.

Ms. Joslin’s Testimony Was Purely Propensity Evidence That Was Not Relevant To Any
Permissible Purpose

1.

Common Scheme Or Plan

Under Rule 404(b), evidence of uncharged misconduct “may be admissible for certain
purposes, including ‘preparation, plan, knowledge, [and] identity,’ which purposes are most
frequently grouped together under the rubric of ‘common scheme or plan.’” 3 Joy, 155 Idaho at
9 (quoting Sate v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54 (2009). The “‘common scheme or plan’ contemplated
by Rule 404(b) is thus ‘a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more
crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. . . .’” Id. (quoting
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54–55). To be admissible, the charged and uncharged conduct must be
“linked in a way that permits the inference that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course
of conduct leading up to the charged offense,” or must “demonstrate a planned course of
connected behavior.” Joy, 155 Idaho at 10 (emphasis added). Such evidence is based on the
permissible inference that, regardless of character, a person who has formulated a plan is more
likely to carry out the elements of the plan.” 1 McCormick On Evid. § 190 (7th ed.) (emphasis
added). This court has cautioned trial courts “that they must carefully examine evidence offered
for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of a common scheme or plan in order to

3

Without taking a detour through the meandering history of the phrase “common scheme or
plan,” it is worth noting that Rule 404(b) does not list “common scheme or plan” as a permissible
purpose, but lists “preparation,” “plan,” “knowledge,” and “identity” individually. And with
good reason—the term “common scheme or plan” is sufficiently amorphous that district courts
often erroneously admit propensity evidence on that basis. Perhaps that common misstep could
be avoided if the parties and courts used the more concrete terms set out in Rule 404(b) to
identify specifically whether the uncharged conduct is relevant to prove preparation, plan,
knowledge, or identity, because the way in which uncharged conduct may or may not be relevant
depends greatly on which purpose it purports to prove.
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determine whether the requisite relationship exists.”

Grist, 147 Idaho at 54–55 (emphasis

added).
The district court erred by concluding that Ms. Joslin’s testimony was relevant to show a
common scheme or plan with the charged conduct in this case.4 Both the court and the State
mistakenly believed that Ms. Joslin’s allegations needed to only be sufficiently similar to
Ms. Darby’s allegations to be admissible. (See R., pp.253–54, 202–03, 207–10.) However, there
is no “similar crimes” exception to Rule 404(b), and Mr. Joslin’s identity was not at issue.
(Tr. Vol. III, p.529, Ls.9–16; Tr. Vol. II, p.146, L.11–p.149, L.11.) Therefore, that Ms. Joslin’s
allegations were similar to Ms. Darby’s allegations did not make Ms. Joslin’s testimony relevant
to any permissible purpose. Instead, the only value of her testimony was based purely on
propensity: because Mr. Joslin committed these crimes in a similar way in the past, he must
have done it again. The court erroneously concluded that the evidence was relevant to show
“common scheme or plan.”
As an initial matter, “[t]he mere fact that the charged and uncharged conduct is similar
does not by itself establish the admissibility of prior conduct evidence to show a common
scheme or plan.” Joy, 155 Idaho at 9. In that respect, this Court’s use of the terms “related,”

4

Because this Court has treated preparation and knowledge as part of “common scheme or plan,”
Mr. Joslin does not address those terms separately. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 54. However, to the
extent this Court determines they should be addressed separately, Ms. Joslin’s testimony was not
relevant to show either. First, her testimony did not tend to show Mr. Joslin prepared to commit
the alleged crimes against Ms. Darby, at least without resorting to the impermissible inference
that “if he did it once, he probably did it again.” Joy, 155 Idaho at 11. It was not relevant to
Mr. Joslin’s knowledge for the same reason, not to mention that his knowledge was not at issue
in the first place. See State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230 (2008) (“Sheldon’s statements
regarding his past dealings in methamphetamine do not prove that he knew of the
methamphetamine in his vehicle . . .”); State v. Waller, 140 Idaho 764, 766 (Ct. App. 2004)
(explaining that the “testimony was probative to show Waller’s awareness that the credit card
bearing Ryan Conway’s name was stolen” and went to “prove that Waller used Conway’s credit
card ‘with intent to defraud.’”).
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“linked,” and “embracing,” when discussing the requisite showing are crucial. See, e.g., id. at 9–
11. They do not connote that the charged conduct must be sufficiently “similar,” or even
identical, to be admissible. Instead, “the defendant’s charged and uncharged conduct [must be]
linked in a way that permits the inference that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course
of conduct leading up to the charged offense.” Id. at 10.
If the conduct is merely similar, without evidence to show that the uncharged conduct
was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the charged offense, then at most the
uncharged conduct could go to prove identity.

See State v. Williams, 163 Idaho 285, 294

(Ct. App. 2018) (“Other crime evidence may be admitted if the evidence of the other crimes is so
distinctive that it can be seen as a ‘signature’ identifying a unique defendant. Thus, the question
for the court then is whether the events are linked by common characteristics that go beyond
merely showing a criminal propensity but instead objectively tend to establish that the same
person committed all the acts.”) (emphasis added) (citing Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668; Grist,
147 Idaho at 54–55); State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 338 (1990) (admitting evidence of Martin’s
prior sexual assaults, which shared many similarities with the charged crime, to show Martin was
the assailant when the assailant’s identity was at issue).
The district court here appears to have taken one phrase from this Court’s jurisprudence
out of context to find that the similarities between the charged and uncharged conduct made
Ms. Joslin’s testimony relevant to show a common scheme or plan. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 9
(stating that the conduct must be “linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely
showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that the same
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person committed all the acts.”5) (quoting Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668); R., p.210 (“The
circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct are so similar that they objectively tend to
demonstrate that the same person committed both acts. Therefore, this Court determines as a
matter of law that the evidence to be introduced at trial is relevant for a permissible purpose,
specifically, to show a common scheme or plan.”).) As Joy made clear, mere similarities,
without evidence that the uncharged conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading
up to the charged offense, are not enough to amount to a common scheme or plan. 155 Idaho at
10. Further, everyone agreed Mr. Joslin’s identity was not at issue. (See, e.g., R., p.255 (the
State’s motion arguing that Ms. Joslin’s testimony was relevant to consent because it expected
that Mr. Joslin’s defense at trial would be that Ms. Joslin consented); Tr. Vol. 529, Ls.9–16 (the
district court finding that the evidence goes to all of the Rule 404(b) exceptions except identity);
Tr. Vol. II, p.146, L.11–p.149, L.11 (Mr. Joslin’s opening argument, in which he acknowledged
having consensual sex with Ms. Darby on the day in question). Therefore, mere similarities,
even “remarkable” or “stark” ones, were not enough to make Ms. Joslin’s testimony relevant to
any fact of consequence. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 9; Martin, 118 Idaho at 338. To conclude
otherwise would rely on the impermissible inference that if Mr. Joslin committed these same acts
before in a similar way, he probably did it again. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 11.

5

Since Johnson, this Court has often repeated the statement that “[t]he events must be linked by
common characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must
objectively tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts,” when discussing the
requisite showing for a common scheme or plan. Joy, 155 Idaho at 9 (quoting Johnson,
148 Idaho at 668). Because that statement was not explicitly tied to proving identity, Mr. Joslin
contends that it cannot be read in isolation from the other requirements for showing a common
scheme or plan because the only time that evidence that “the same person committed all the acts”
is relevant is if identity is at issue.
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Next, the charged and uncharged conduct in this case was not “linked in a way that
permits the inference that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up
to the charged offense.”6 Joy, 155 Idaho at 10. While, in some cases, the uncharged conduct
might “bear such a resemblance to the charged offense that the existence of a common plan may
legitimately be inferred,”7 that is not the case here. State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 689 (2012).
These crimes shared some similarities (which Mr. Joslin continues to maintain are not
particularly remarkable), but they were separated by ten years. There is no evidence that, when
Mr. Joslin allegedly strangled and raped Ms. Joslin, he planned to strangle and rape Ms. Darby
ten years later, or that he planned to strangle and rape his ex-girlfriends in general. Thus, it
could not reasonably be inferred that Mr. Joslin planned the alleged strangulation and rape of
Ms. Joslin in 2006 as part of a course of conduct leading up to the alleged strangulation and rape
of Ms. Darby in 2016. Put another way, the charged and uncharged conduct does not give rise to
the permissible inference that Mr. Joslin had a plan and thus was more likely to carry out its
elements. See 1 McCormick On Evid. § 190.

6

Importantly, the State did not argue, nor did the district court find, that the crimes against
Ms. Joslin were part of a course of conduct leading up to the alleged crimes against Ms. Darby.
(See generally R., pp.249–70,199–214; 3/30/17 Tr., p.5, L.15–p.10, L.14, p.15, L.17–p.17, L.19;
Tr. Vol. III, p.521, L.16–p.530, L.12.)
7
Although this Court has approved of using the “common scheme or plan” exception in this
way, i.e., to admit what would otherwise be propensity evidence by showing the defendant had a
“plan” to commit two or more similar and temporally-related crimes, commentators suggest that
is not the type of “plan” contemplated by Rule 404(b) because it necessarily rests on the
impermissible inference that “if he did it once, he probably did it again.” See 1 McCormick On
Evid. § 190 (7th ed.). Instead, the correct “plan” is one involving bad acts, often of different
types, but which are committed in furtherance of a common objective. For example, if a
defendant “steals a car to use it in a robbery, the automobile theft can be proved in a prosecution
for the robbery.” Id.; see also State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14 (Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that
evidence of the uncharged conduct, using drugs with the minor victim, was admissible to show
“Blackstead’s steps allegedly effectuating a plan to accomplish one of the charged [sex]
offenses.”). Only this type of “plan” rests on the “permissible inference that, regardless of
18

A closer look at this Court’s decisions addressing “common scheme or plan” underscores
the fact that Ms. Joslin’s testimony went to nothing more than propensity. In State v. Field,
144 Idaho 559, 566 (2007), this Court held that the district court erred by joining two charges:8
lewd conduct for manual to genital contact with seven-year-old H.P. while she stayed at Field’s
home in 2003, and sexual abuse of a minor for rubbing the buttocks of seventeen-year-old T.B.
while she was housesitting and babysitting for Field in 2005. It explained that,
These separate acts did not constitute part of a common scheme or plan. There is
nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense against T.B. he had a
plan to also commit an offense against H.P. specifically, or to commit an offense
against someone he would be “babysitting” two years later. The offenses were
not part of one continuing action against a single individual as in Estes, and do
not contain the striking similarities found in Schwartzmiller. T.B. and H.P.,
though both minors, had different ages (one was a young child, the other was
almost an adult), the type of sexual contact was different (digital vaginal
penetration and the rubbing of buttocks), and the incidents occurred two years
apart. The similarities that both girls were only temporarily in the household, that
the acts occurred in Field’s home, and that the abuse began with “innocent”
touching are insufficient to prove a common scheme or plan.
Id. at 566–67 (emphasis added).
In Johnson, this Court disapproved of the district court’s decision to admit evidence that
the defendant sexually abused his eight-year-old sister when he was a teenager in his trial for
allegedly sexually abusing his daughter when she was six to seven years old. 148 Idaho at 668–
69. The Court found that the similarities in that case—the age of the victims, that both victims
saw Johnson as an authority figure, and that Johnson asked both victims to touch his penis—

character, a person who has formulated a plan is more likely to carry out the elements of the
plan.” 1 McCormick On Evid. § 190 (7th ed.) (emphasis added).
8
Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) allows offenses to be joined when based on “two or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” Thus, this
Court has explained that “the analysis is the same as to whether the offenses are part of a
common scheme or plan permitting joinder under Criminal Rule 8(a) and whether the defendant
would be prejudiced by joinder because the offenses were not part of a common scheme or plan
under Evidence Rule 404(b).” State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 760 (2015).
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were “sadly far too unremarkable” to allow the inference that they formed a common scheme or
plan. Id. at 669. Although the Johnson Court ended its analysis there, the passage of time
between the charged and uncharged conduct was equally fatal. It all but foreclosed the necessary
finding that, when Johnson was just a teenager, he planned to molest his future daughter.
See Field, 144 Idaho at 566; Joy, 155 Idaho at 10–11.
This Court in Joy held that the evidence in that case was not relevant to show a common
scheme or plan because it did not “demonstrate a planned course of connected behavior.” Joy,
155 Idaho at 10. Joy was charged with domestic battery, sexual penetration by a foreign object,
and kidnapping his wife, and the district court admitted evidence that Joy had abused his wife in
the past by engaging in anal intercourse without her consent, tying her up and slapping her on
two different days, and throwing her down an embankment. Id. at 10. In ruling that evidence
inadmissible, this Court acknowledged that the “conduct was similar, [but that] the only way the
prior misconduct makes the charged conduct more likely to have occurred is by propensity. . . .
[I]f he did it once, he probably did it again.” Id. at 11. Instead, “to be admissible under Rule
404(b), evidence of prior misconduct must show more than a superficial similarity to the nature
and details of the charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant’s charged and
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the prior conduct was
planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the charged offense.” Id. (emphasis added).
In Pepcorn, on the other hand, this Court upheld the district court’s decision to admit
evidence of Pepcorn’s uncharged sexual abuse of many of his wife’s relatives in his trial for
sexually abusing two of his wife’s nieces. 152 Idaho at 690. The uncharged conduct in that case
included allegations of various types of sexual misconduct which were not necessarily similar to
the charged conduct. Id. at 682–86. Unlike in most cases, however, there was direct evidence of
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an actual plan—Pepcorn had said that he molested his wife’s relatives because she hadn’t had
sex with him for a long time and he had to “have it with somebody.” Id. at 685. Therefore, the
Court did not have to decide whether the evidence gave rise to a legitimate inference that
Pepcorn had a plan to abuse his wife’s relatives. Id. at 689.
The Court in State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 93 (1984), held that the lewd conduct
charges, both of which took place in 1978 with two fourteen-year-old boys, were properly joined
because the facts demonstrated a common plan: “Schwartzmiller frequents areas where young
boys may be found, befriends boys with no father figure in the home, entices them from their
homes, lowers their natural inhibitions through the use of drugs and alcohol, and commits sex
acts upon them.” Because Schwartzmiller focused only on the similarities between the crimes,
without discussing whether “the charged and uncharged conduct [was] linked in a way that
permits the inference that the prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up
to the charged offense,” its reasoning is no longer sound after Joy. 155 Idaho at 10. The
ultimate conclusion that Schwartzmiller had a common plan may still be correct, however,
because the two charges were contemporaneous with one another.

See Schwartzmiller,

107 Idaho at 93.
Here like in Field and Joy, “[t]here is nothing to show that at the time [Mr. Joslin]
committed the offense against [Ms. Joslin] he had a plan to also commit an offense against
[Ms. Darby] specifically, or to commit an offense against [an ex-girlfriend ten] years later.”
Field, 144 Idaho at 566–67; see also Joy, 155 Idaho at 10 (finding there was no “planned course
of connected behavior.”). And although the two allegations were somewhat similar, there was
neither direct evidence of a common scheme as in Pepcorn, nor a legitimate inference that both
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crimes were part of a common scheme like in Schwartzmiller, since here the crimes took place
ten years apart.
In short, the “common scheme or plan” exception to bad acts evidence is not a “similar
crimes” exception.

The charged and uncharged conduct must be connected in some way,

whether by direct evidence or a legitimate inference. Here, we have neither. The district court
thus erred by concluding that Ms. Joslin’s testimony was relevant to show a “common scheme or
plan.”

2.

Motive, Opportunity, Intent, And Absence Of Mistake Or Accident

The district court concluded, apparently as an afterthought once it heard Ms. Joslin’s
offer of proof at trial, that her testimony went to every exception under Rule 404(b), except
identity:

“Motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, certainly absence of mistake or

accident.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.529, Ls.9–16.) The State never argued as much, and with good
reason; Ms. Joslin’s testimony was not relevant to any of those purposes.
“Motive is generally defined as that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a
particular act.” State v. Salinas, 164 Idaho 42, 423 P.3d 463, 465 (2018) (quoting Pepcorn,
152 Idaho at 689; State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 53 (1969)). “Evidence of motive is relevant
‘when the existence of a motive is a circumstance tending to make it more probable that the
person in question did the act.’” State v. Capone, 164 Idaho 118, 426 P.3d 469, 476 (2018)
(quoting State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308 (2014)); see, e.g., Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 591
(2013) (evidence about crimes committed by BMC, a gang to which Almaraz allegedly
belonged, was relevant to show Almaraz was motivated to kill the victim because of a gang
rivalry); Russo, 157 Idaho at 308 (holding that evidence of Russo’s rape fantasies, including that
his computer contained videos of violent rapes and that he had watched one such video before
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committing a prior rape, was relevant to prove motive in his current rape prosecution); State v.
Folk, 157 Idaho 869, 877 (2014) (holding that Folk’s prior convictions for molesting two boys
were not relevant to prove his motive for allegedly molesting the victim in a similar way). Here,
Ms. Joslin’s testimony did not go to show what led or tempted Mr. Joslin to allegedly strangle or
rape Ms. Darby, and thus did not make it more probable that he strangled or raped Ms. Darby.
Salinas, 423 P.3d at 465; Capone, 426 P.3d at 476. Ms. Joslin’s testimony was not relevant to
motive.
Prior conduct can also be relevant to prove “opportunity in the sense of access to or
presence at the scene of the crime or in the sense of possessing distinctive or unusual skills or
abilities employed in the commission of the crime charged.” Folk, 157 Idaho at 878 (quoting 1
McCormick on Evidence § 190 (6th ed. 2006) (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g., id. at 878–79
(explaining that whether Folk had the “opportunity” to commit the charged crime was not a
materially disputed issue and thus his prior conviction was not relevant to prove opportunity);
State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 154–55 (2011) (evidence that Gomez abused the victim’s sisters
in similar ways was relevant to opportunity when Gomez claimed that it would have been
impossible for him to abuse the victim in a small house full of people); State v. Marks, 156 Idaho
559, 566 (2014) (same). Ms. Joslin’s testimony did not show that Mr. Joslin had access to or
was present at the scene of the crime, nor did it show that he employed distinctive or unusual
skills or abilities when committing the crime charged.” Folk, 157 Idaho at, 878. Ms. Joslin’s
testimony was not relevant to prove opportunity.
Next, uncharged conduct can be used to prove the defendant’s intent. Intent, in the
context of Rule 404(b), “is the purpose to use a particular means to effect a certain result.”
Salinas, 423 P.3d at 465 (quoting Stevens, 93 Idaho at 53). Mr. Joslin’s intent was not at issue in

23

this case, but even if it were, Ms. Joslin’s testimony was not relevant to show intent, absent
reliance on the impermissible inference that “if he did it once, he probably did it again.”
Finally, evidence of uncharged conduct can be relevant to rebut the defendant’s claim
that he did the criminal act by mistake or accident.

See, e.g., State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217

(1998) (finding evidence that Cardell, a massage therapist, had touched the vaginal areas of other
clients was relevant to show absence of mistake or accident in his prosecution for lewd conduct
when Cardell acknowledged massaging the victim’s inner thighs and touching the outside of her
vaginal area but denied directly touching her vagina); State v. Ortega, 157 Idaho 782, 788
(Ct. App. 2014) (evidence that Ortega was violent towards toddlers was relevant to disprove his
claim that his two-year-old son’s injuries were accidental). Mr. Joslin has not claimed he
accidentally strangled or had sex with Ms. Darby, and so absence of mistake or accident is not at
issue.
In sum, Ms. Joslin’s testimony was not relevant to any fact of consequence at trial. 9 It
was purely propensity evidence which invited the jury to draw the impermissible inference that
“if he did it once, he probably did it again.” Because the district court erred by admitting
Ms. Joslin’s testimony, this Court should vacate Mr. Joslin’s judgment of conviction and remand
this case for a new trial.

9

The State’s secondary argument, which the district court never decided, focused on whether
Ms. Joslin’s testimony was relevant to disprove that Ms. Darby consented. (R., pp.254–55.)
Mr. Joslin is unaware of any published decision from the Idaho appellate courts approving of a
district court’s decision to admit prior uncharged acts to disprove consent, and certainly
Ms. Joslin’s testimony was not properly admitted on this basis. Just as above, Ms. Joslin’s
testimony could only disprove consent if the jury drew the impermissible inference that “if there
was no consent before, there was probably no consent this time.” Conversely and for the same
reasons, Mr. Joslin could not have introduced evidence of prior consensual sexual encounters
with Ms. Darby or anyone else to show that he had consensual sex with Ms. Darby on the night
in question.
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B.

Whatever Slight Probative Value Ms. Joslin’s Testimony Could Have Possibly Had Is
Heavily Outweighed By The Danger That It Would Unfairly Prejudice Mr. Joslin,
Confuse The Issues, And Mislead The Jury
Even if evidence is relevant, the court may exclude it “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury.” I.R.E. 403. All “prior bad act” evidence is inherently prejudicial. Cooke v. State,
149 Idaho 233, 241 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 221 (Ct. App. 2009). The
question is therefore whether it is unfairly prejudicial. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it
suggests decision on an improper basis.” State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2011).
Here, the district court found that the amount of evidence the State sought to present—the
testimony of a “single witness”—weighed against a finding of unfair prejudice, and that the
“substantial similarity” between the allegations mitigated against their “temporal remoteness.”
(R., p.212.) The court acknowledged that that the evidence “certainly is prejudicial,” but also
found it to be “extremely probative,” and thus admissible. (Tr. Vol. III, p.529, L.17–p.530, L.5.)
The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards or reach its
decision by the exercise of reason. Because Ms. Joslin’s testimony was not relevant to any fact
of consequence in this case, her testimony had no probative value at all. But even assuming
Ms. Joslin’s testimony were relevant to something other than propensity, whatever slight
probative value that testimony possibly could have had is heavily outweighed by its incredibly
prejudicial, confusing, and misleading nature. The district court thus abused its discretion by
admitting it.
The State called Ms. Joslin as its very last witness and presented her testimony to try to
highlight parallels with Ms. Darby’s allegations. (See Tr. Vol. III, p.541, L.15–p.544, L.22.)
Like Ms. Darby, Ms. Joslin testified that Mr. Joslin was uninvited in her home; that he strangled
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her with his hands until she would pass out, let her come to while covering her mouth with his
hand, and then repeated that process multiple times; and that eventually he raped her. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.542, L.25–p.544, L.22.) Ms. Joslin’s testimony invited the jury to draw the impermissible
inference that if Mr. Joslin committed such similar crimes before, he must have committed these
crimes. That inference is particularly prejudicial in this “he said/she said” case, because the
State also suggested that Ms. Joslin corroborated Ms. Darby’s version of events and thus directed
the jury to rely on that impermissible inference to find Ms. Darby to be more credible. (Tr. Vol.
III, p.573, Ls.9–22 (“Of course, the last piece of corroboration can’t be understated, and that
essentially is this instruction that the judge gave you only goes to such things as intent, plan,
absence of mistake, those types of things. But what we’re talking about here is Mr. Joslin’s
similarity of conduct with Miss Darby and his ex-wife, Miss Joslin.”) (emphasis added), p.583,
Ls.20–23 (“all the other corroborating aspects of this evidence . . . as well as Miss Joslin, prove
beyond any doubt at all that he committed these two crimes.”); see Grist, 147 Idaho at 54
(discussing how “the theoretical underpinning of the admissibility of uncharged misconduct for
purposes of ‘corroboration’ as articulated in [an earlier case] is indistinguishable from admitting
such evidence based upon the accused’s propensity to engage in such behavior based upon his or
her past behavior.”).) Thus, contrary to the district court’s finding that the similarities between
the two crimes increased the probative value of Ms. Joslin’s testimony, those similarities only
went to increase its prejudice. Relatedly, that only one witness testified to Mr. Joslin’s prior bad
acts does not weigh against finding unfair prejudice. Ms. Joslin’s testimony was so incredibly
damning that any additional bad acts testimony would have been cumulative.
After hearing that Mr. Joslin committed the same crimes, in similar ways, against his exwife, and being told that Ms. Joslin’s testimony corroborated Ms. Darby’s allegations, the jury
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surely drew the impermissible inference that “if he did it once, he probably did it again.” The
district court abused its discretion by concluding that the unfair prejudice and confusion created
by Ms. Joslin’s testimony did not substantially outweigh whatever insignificant probative value
it possibly could have had.

C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove Ms. Joslin’s Testimony Was Harmless Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt
When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears

the burden of proving, “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.’”

Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at

24). The question “is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the
presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of” the inadmissible evidence. Yates v.
Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added).
The error surely contributed to the verdicts in this case, and so the State will be unable to
meet its burden of proving the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As discussed above,
the State called Ms. Joslin as its very last witness, presented her testimony to highlight
similarities with Ms. Darby’s allegations, and argued that Ms. Joslin’s testimony corroborated
Ms. Darby’s allegations in both of its closing arguments. (Tr. Vol. III, p.573, Ls.9–22 (“Of
course, the last piece of corroboration can’t be understated, and that essentially is this instruction
that the judge gave you only goes to such things as intent, plan, absence of mistake, those types
of things.

But what we’re talking about here is Mr. Joslin’s similarity of conduct with
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Miss Darby and his ex-wife, Miss Joslin.”) (emphasis added), p.583, Ls.20–23 (“all the other
corroborating aspects of this evidence . . . as well as Miss Joslin, prove beyond any doubt at all
that he committed these two crimes.”).)
Further, the error surely contributed to the verdicts despite the purported limiting
instruction in this case. See Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669–70 (holding that error in admitting prior
bad act evidence was prejudicial despite the limiting instruction). The court here did not give the
jury a limiting instruction until the middle of the closing instructions, and even then it told the
jury it could consider Ms. Joslin’s testimony for any number of things which it did not actually
go to prove. (Tr. Vol. III, p.548, L.14–p.549, L.12; R., p.97 (Jury Instruction 20, stating that that
the jury could consider the unnamed evidence of other crimes “for the limited purpose of proving
[Mr. Joslin’s] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake of
accident.”).) Ms. Joslin’s testimony, without a doubt, contributed to the verdicts in this case, and
the State will be unable to prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Joslin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 26th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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